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ABSTRACT
The last quarter of a century has featured a surge in interest and studies 
on the commons, spearheaded, of course, by the efforts of Elinor Ostrom. 
These efforts have problematized the once well-established paradigm 
of the tragedy of the commons most clearly described by Garrett Hardin 
in 1968. One could say that the commons, thus, have become a fundamental 
field of study in most social sciences. This is not the case in the field of 
legal scholarship (with one noticeable exception that I will discuss later), 
which leads me to the overarching issue of this essay, namely the difficult 
relationship between jurists and the commons. The phrase “difficult 
relationship” does not refer to an explicit antagonism, but to something 
even worse: complete indifference and a scandalous lack of knowledge. 
While my main purpose is to try to explain this sorry state of affairs, I 
also hope to make a more general point on the nature of law and legal 
change. In this sense, the commons can be considered a case-study in 
legal theory. The main issue of this paper is to tackle following sub-
questions. What is the status of commons in the Western European legal 
discourse? Why do most legal scholars pay such a poor attention to the 
growing literature on the commons in other disciplines? What factors 
contribute to this peculiar case of cultural deafness? What promise of 
improvement does the future hold?
1. Posing the question
Let us start with a true but banal statement: since at least the 1990s the commons 
have become a major topic in almost all social sciences. If I had no fear of overbur-
dening the patience of my readers with an even more banal phrase, I would speak 
of a paradigm shift. The clearest manifestation of the success of the commons – 
and of the critique levelled against the previous paradigm, the “tragedy of the com-
mons” – is the Nobel Prize for Economics awarded to Elinor Ostrom in 2008. In 
her work “Governing the Commons”, Ostrom shows that Garret Hardin’s prediction 
about the destruction of common goods because of overuse is less than accurate in 
a wide array of practical cases. I am not going to expand further on the vast front 
of research that is being conducted in the field, nor am I going to discuss the merits 
of Ostrom’s work and of her design principles for a functioning commons regime. I 
am instead going to focus on the role, or rather its absence, played by legal scholars.
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The most perceptive readers have probably noticed that I opened this Article by 
mentioning “almost all social sciences”. Among these, legal scholarship is playing 
the role of the great absentee. Of course, this statement needs some qualifications. 
Firstly, there is at least one legal field that has displayed a healthy interest for the 
commons: intellectual property law. However, the inroads made by the new para-
digm in intellectual property can easily be explained by the peculiar goods which 
the field is concerned with. Indifferent to the limitations typical of material goods, 
intellectual property can be shared without diminishing its functionality. This fea-
ture has of course been stressed by the development of information technology, 
generating a wide set of practical issues that lend themselves exceptionally well to 
be addressed through the prism of the commons. Secondly, there is a minority of 
legal scholars that has displayed a considerable interest for the commons even out-
side of intellectual property. A particularly interesting case concerns the Italian legal 
academia, spearheaded in this regard by scholars such as Ugo Mattei and Stefano 
Rodotà.1 These have managed to effectively bridge the gap between the academic 
analysis and the political discourse, injecting the commons in the national politi-
cal debate. Moreover, the Italian Court of Cassation itself has been influenced by 
the work of the aforementioned scholars in a series of cases concerning enclosed 
fisheries in the Venetian Lagoon.2
Regardless of the importance of these exceptions, it is difficult to deny that the 
average Western legal scholar is unaware of, or at least not interested in, the rich 
debate about the commons that in the last decades has been so crucial in other so-
cial sciences. In this article, I will try to explore some of the factors that have con-
tributed to making the legal discourse a less than fertile ground for the commons. 
Such an exercise is of obvious interest for legal scholars, as it offers an occasion to 
discuss the capacity of the legal discourse to relate to other social sciences and to 
update its own theoretical foundation. It is fair to say that many of the challenges 
that our societies are facing transcend the classical distinction between private and 
public law, which mirrors the state-market dichotomy. For instance, one could ar-
gue that the preservation of the biological conditions for our survival on the plan-
et requires a different approach to law. Until now, the recipe has largely mirrored 
Hardin’s recommendations. In other words, private law, concerned with interest 
of individual parties in the present, handles the resources that are on the market 
with little concern for the interests of future generations. These are instead dealt 
with by applying a band aid of public law, commonly known as environmental 
law. A strong case can be made for a restructuring of private law itself to take into 
consideration collective interests. Such a realignment will be difficult to achieve 
without a better understanding of the commons and the theoretical work that is 
being done in the field by other social scientists.
The topic, however, is not an insular one. The attitude of legal scholarship to-
wards the commons, or indeed any other socially desirable institution, is a cru-
cial factor for the success of said institution. For better or worse, law is the main 
normative tool of the West and its conceptual landscape defines the way states, as 
1  Of particular interest are the works of the Rodotà-commission, charged with reform-
ing the provisions of the Italian Civil Code about public goods. See Mattei et al. 2010.
2  Cassazione, S.U., nr. 3665, 3811, 3812, 3813, 3936, 3937, 3938 and 3939 of 2011.
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represented by judges and civil servants, describe reality and define facts as rele-
vant or irrelevant for decision-making. One could speculate about what long-lasting 
success 19th century liberalism would have had without the enthusiastic participa-
tion of jurists. Non-lawyers invested in promoting the commons as a tool to pro-
mote social progress, be it in the form of sustainable development or in the form 
of a limitation of free market capitalism, would therefore be wise not to ignore the 
legal discourse, as its particular nature may very well nullify any advances achieved 
in other fields and domains.
The main issue of this article can be articulated in a few sub-questions: a) What 
is the status of commons in the Western European legal discourse? b) Why do most 
legal scholars pay such a poor attention to the growing literature on the commons 
in other disciplines? What factors contribute to this peculiar case of cultural deaf-
ness? c) What promise of improvement does the future hold?
2. Property: at the heart of the Western private law
To understand the shaky status of the commons in the legal discourse it is useful 
to have a basic appreciation for the majestic role played by property in Western 
private law. In fact, one could argue that the core of the Western legal tradition, 
which was largely moulded in its current shape during the 19th century, is born out 
of an ideological reaction against the commons and a matching support for private 
property. The topic that I am now addressing is of immense historical complexity. 
Thus, I can only offer a few snapshots from the French and the English legal sys-
tems, which can be considered good representatives of their respective legal fam-
ilies (the civil law and the common law).
Already in the earliest years of the Norman domination, the commons, a con-
stant feature of the English countryside since the Saxon time, had come under 
strong pressure from the aristocrats, especially keen on enclosing forests to use 
them for their favourite pastime: hunting (Wright 1928: 166–167; Shoard 1999: 100). 
The most serious menace against the commons did, however, arise during the 16th 
century, when the profitable wool-trade (largely responsible for making England 
a dominant economic power and for starting capitalism itself) encouraged a tran-
sition from agriculture to shepherding (Scrutton 2003: 72). This growing industry 
required an intensive use of land and greatly accelerated the enclosure of the com-
mons. This development is eloquently depicted by Thomas More in his Utopia. 
Hythloday is explaining the causes of criminality in England:
The increase of pasture, (…) by which your sheep, which are naturally mild, and eas-
ily kept in order, may be said now to devour men and unpeople, not only villages, 
but towns: for wherever it is found that the sheep of any soil yield a softer and rich-
er wool than ordinary, there the nobility and gentry, and even those holy men the 
abbots, not contented with the old rents which their farms yielded, nor thinking it 
enough that they, living at their ease, do no good to the public, resolve to do it hurt 
instead of good. They stop the course of agriculture, destroying houses and towns, 
reserving only the churches, and enclose grounds that they may lodge their sheep 
in them. As if forests and parks had swallowed up too little of the land, those wor-
thy countrymen turn the best inhabited places into solitudes; for when an insatiable 
wretch, who is a plague to his country, resolves to enclose many thousand acres of 
LEGAL IDEOLOGY AND THE COMMONS208 │ FILIPPO VALGUARNERA
ground, the owners, as well as tenants, are turned out of their possessions by trick 
or by main force, or, being wearied out by ill usage, they are forced to sell them; by 
which means those miserable people, both men and women, married and unmar-
ried, old and young, with their poor but numerous families (since country business 
requires many hands), are all forced to change their seats, not knowing whither to 
go; and they must sell, almost for nothing, their household stuff, which could not 
bring them much money, even though they might stay for a buyer. (More 1751: 17–18)
Despite the early concerns of several prominent English intellectuals, the en-
closure movement accelerated and did eventually receive a strong support by the 
Parliament starting in the 18th century (Neeson 1996; Mingay 1997: 20). The enclo-
sures did also leave clear traces in the common law. The primary and most vulner-
able target were the customary rights that depended on the rightsholder’s status 
(for instance, as inhabitant in a village). The Gateward’s Case of 1607, frequently 
quoted in the following centuries, concerned a case of trespass in which the de-
fendant claimed a customary right for the inhabitants of the town of Stixwold in 
Lincolnshire to pasture their animals on the land of the plaintiff. The Court of 
Common Pleas rejected this argument by affirming that such a right of common 
would have been too uncertain:
What estate shall he have who is inhabitant in the common, when it appears he hath 
no estate or interest in the house (but a mere habitation and dwelling), in respect 
of which he ought to have his common? For none can have interest in common in 
respect of a house in which he hath no interest. (…) Such common will be transito-
ry, and altogether uncertain, for it will follow the person, and for no certain time or 
estate, but during his inhabitancy, and such manner of interest the law will not suf-
fer, for custom ought to extend to that which hath certainty and continuance. (…) It 
will be against the nature and quality of a common, for every common may be sus-
pended or extinguished, but such a common will be so incident to the person, that 
no person certain can extinguish it, but as soon as he who releases, &c. removes, 
the new inhabitant shall have it.3
This principle was then applied, in 1741, in Dean and Chapter of Ely v.  Warren, 
concerning a common right of turbary.4 The court concluded that “an occupant, 
who is no more than a tenant at will, can never have a right to take away the soil 
of the lord”. In a similar fashion, the Court of Common Pleas in the case Steel v. 
Houghton (1788) denied the customary right of the poor of a parish to glean on the 
fields after harvest. Of course, the courts’ antipathy towards property rights differ-
ent from individual property did not develop in a cultural void. The 16th and 18th 
centuries saw the rise of natural law political theories that promoted property as a 
fundamental human right. The most well-known is without a doubt John Locke’s 
work (1986: 129), which assumed that property already existed in the state of nature 
and that the state, created through the social contract, had among its core duties to 
protect it. In the realm of legal scholarship, William Blackstone (1765–1769: 2), in 
an often-quoted passage of his Commentaries on the Laws of England, encapsulat-
ed the ideological passion for individual property typical of his epoch:
3  Gateward’s Case (1607) 77 E.R. 344.
4  Dean and Chapter of Ely v. Warren (1741) 26 E.R. 518.
THE COMMONS │ 209
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affec-
tions of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which 
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclu-
sion of the right of any other individual in the universe.
As pointed out by Carol Rose (1998: 601), it might be the case that this quote 
has been overused and isolated from its context. A broader reading of Blackstone 
certainly results in a richer and more nuanced impression of his view of property 
rights. However, the success of these bombastic lines is by itself revealing.
A similar development occurred in France, although filtered through a very 
different legal tradition. As in England, farmers in a large area of France relied 
since the Middle Ages on common rights on the land. As in England, these rights 
came under pressure at first by the aristocracy, wanting to extend its control over 
the land, and later by novel economic theories, best represented by the influential 
physiocratic movement, which promoted individual ownership of the land, rea-
soning that only an individual owner would invest the capital needed to develop 
the resource adequately (Quesnay 1969: 331–332; Samuels 1961: 99). The Crown it-
self, during the 18th century, actively promoted a division of common land among 
individual owners, although only with limited success (Vivier 1998: 35). This can 
in part be explained by the fact that the Crown could not muster the strength to 
attack the feudal system on which its own power was based.
The French Revolution was obviously not constrained by such considerations. 
Individual property became in fact the new ideological foundation of the bourgeoi-
sie in power, effectively substituting the religious basis of the monarchy. A clear sig-
nal of the new status attributed to private property came as early as in 1789, firstly 
with the decree of the 4th of August which abolished the feudal order (Lévy-A. and 
Castaldo 2010: 459–460) and a few weeks later with the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen. Article 17 states that:
Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one can be deprived of private us-
age, if it is not when the public necessity, legally noted, evidently requires it, and 
under the condition of a just and prior indemnity.
Those political acts, however, could not have been translated into factual so-
cial change without an alliance between the ideals of the revolutionary bourgeoi-
sie and the hommes de loi. After a short crisis brought about by the revolutionaries’ 
distrust for judges and lawyers – who were perceived as an expression of the old 
regime – jurists became an integral and vital part of the new order (Kelley and 
Smith 1984: 202–203).
The most prominent result of the alliance between the jurists and the bourgeois 
ideology is the Code Civil of 1804. This monument of French private law embod-
ied many of the ambitions of the Revolution: a radical simplification of the sources 
of law (with legislation acquiring monopoly, at least formally), the unification of 
the legal subject, the idea that legislation should be linguistically accessible. Most 
importantly, property became the central pillar of the whole Code, with two of its 
three books expressly dedicated to it. Article 544 defines property as:
(…) le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue, pourvu 
qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements.
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The phrase “the most absolute way” is obviously a poetic license (as nothing 
can be more absolute than anything else) aimed at emphasizing the importance of 
property in the new social order.
3. Law and society: mirrors or bubbles?  
The problem of self-referentiality
The previous section, despite its inevitable brevity, has hopefully managed to estab-
lish that modern Western private law has been shaped by an alliance between the 
bourgeois ideology and the legal community, inserting private property, conceived 
as an individual and exclusive right, at its very core. This fact, however, cannot by 
itself explain the peculiar impermeability displayed by contemporary legal schol-
arship to the rich theoretical work that has made the commons such an important 
field of study in other social sciences.5 After all, the bourgeois ideology managed in 
its heyday to influence much more than just the legal community. Why then does 
other scholarly fields show a much greater capacity to adapt to changing circum-
stances? Moreover, if the legal community was so welcoming towards the liberal 
ideology, why has it been so refractory towards later developments? An interesting 
example of this cultural stubbornness is provided by the Italian legal system, where 
the republican constitution of 1948 – influenced by the necessity to combine all 
the political forces that had opposed the fascist regime, including Catholics, lib-
erals and communists – at Article 42 attached a “social function” to private prop-
erty. With few interesting exceptions, for example Pugliatti 1964: 278, this norma-
tive element was largely ignored by Italian legal scholars in the following decades.
To address the issue, it is thus crucial to narrow the discussion to the specif-
ic conditions that might set apart legal scholarship, and more generally the legal 
community, from other scholarly fields. The trajectory of this topic inevitably gets 
intertwined with the broader issue of the relationship between law and the general 
culture. In an insightful article published on The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, William Ewald describes two main types of theories: theories that conceive 
law as a reflection of a specific aspect of society such as the economy (Marx) or the 
Volksgeist (Savigny). Ewald (1995: 491) gives these theories the apt label of “mirror 
theories”.6 According to these theories law is simply “life of man itself, observed 
from a particular perspective” (von Savigny 1828: 30). On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, we find conceptions of the relationship between law and society that we 
could (but Ewald does not) call “bubble theories”, that consider law as pertaining to 
a sphere largely isolated from the general culture. Although you could find several 
types of legal scholarship that historically displayed surprisingly little concern for 
the actual problems of society, such as both the German and American brands of 
legal formalism that thrived during the 19th century, it is rare for a legal scholar to 
claim that law and jurists are culturally isolated from society at large. One of the 
few well-known jurists that have made this claim with some degree of consistency 
is professor Alan Watson. Ewald identifies two variations of this claim in Watson’s 
5  For a collection of articles about the commons written by scholars in a variety of fields 
(law being represented only by Carol Rose) see Ostrom et al. 2002.
6  See Ewald 1995: 491.
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writing. He calls them “weak Watson” and “strong Watson”, the first being more 
nuanced and therefore more convincing. I am going to focus just on “weak Wat-
son” for the purpose of this Article.
Watson’s thesis is complex and touches upon four main areas of legal scholar-
ship and their mutual connections: legal history, comparative law, law and society 
and legal transplants. His main critique against the mirror theories develops from 
his view on the social role played by legal elites, the agents of the legal tradition. 
These consider the sources of law “as a given, almost as something sacrosanct 
(…)” (Watson 1985: 119). Lawyers tend, in other words, to look backwards, seeking 
legal authority to support the claim that a certain rule is legally valid. As Watson 
puts it, “it is being in conformity with ‘lawness’ that makes law law” (Watson 1985: 
119). The legal tradition tends therefore to be circular and, to some extent, isolated 
from the rest of the cultural life of society. The claim, at least in the case of “weak 
Watson”, is not that the legal tradition is completely detached from other parts of 
society, nor that it does not to some degree reflect the values and aspirations of a 
certain culture. Watson rather criticizes the assumption of the most extreme mir-
ror theories that law is a direct an immediate response to impulses external to the 
legal tradition. He does so by presenting several examples, from both Roman and 
English law, that show how the legal tradition keeps alive, often for centuries, rules 
that has ceased to have any meaningful social purpose (Watson 2001: 23).
Watson is not the only legal scholar who has been pointing out the self-referen-
tiality of the legal tradition. A major contribution in this direction has come from 
the German scholar Günther Teubner (1988: 1) who introduced the concept of “le-
gal autopoiesis” to break “a taboo in the legal thinking – the taboo of circularity”. 
Legal autopoiesis is an adaptation of Niklas Luhmann’s notion of social autopoie-
sis, which in its own turn is derived from the biological notion of autopoiesis. More 
precisely, the legal system, according to this vision is a second order autopoietic 
system, autonomous with the regard to the first order autopoietic system, namely 
society itself. The term autopoiesis refers, in its essence, to the capacity of a sys-
tem to reproduce and maintain itself.
An important difference between Teubner and Luhmann is that Luhmann con-
ceives the alternative autonomy/heteronomy as a rigid dichotomy (Teubner 1993: 2). 
Teubner conceives autonomy as a matter of degree and develops a model according 
to which the autonomy (and thus self-referentiality) of law develops in three stages. 
In the first phase, law is socially diffuse, meaning that “the elements, structures, pro-
cesses, and boundaries of the legal discourse are identical to those of general social 
communication – or, at least, are heteronomously determined by social commu-
nication” (Teubner 1993: 36–37). In a second phase, law achieves partial autonomy 
by the formation of components – such as legal procedures, legal acts, legal norms 
and legal doctrines – that tend to separate from society (the first order autopoietic 
system). These components, in a third phase, are coupled together in a hypercycle. 
The hypercycle entails that “law begins to reproduce itself in the strict sense of the 
word if its norms and legal acts produce each other reciprocally and process and 
dogmatics establish some relationship between these” (Teubner 1993: 33).
Teubner’s theoretical model shares several points of contact with Watson’s 
claims. A few differences, however, should be pointed out. The most obvious, but 
also the least important for our purposes, is that Teubner’s model, and general 
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style, is considerably more abstract than Watson’s. Both authors take advantage 
of biological metaphors, but Watson’s transplant metaphor is more accessible and 
readily understandable than Teubner’s autopoiesis and hypercycle. On the other 
hand, Teubner’s model, because of its abstract nature, capture a larger slice of social 
reality, as it conceives law as one among several autopoietic systems. More to the 
point, Teubner (1998: 16), following his own model, stresses that law has achieved 
a high degree of autonomy from the national culture and that institutional transfers 
(transplants, in Watson’s terminology) are not “longer a matter of an inter-relation 
of national societies” but rather of “a direct contact between legal orders within 
one global legal discourse”. Teubner (1998: 16–17) however, criticizes Watson for 
neglecting law’s residual cultural ties. It is unclear if Teubner’s critique encom-
passes all of Watson or just “strong Watson”, to adopt Ewald’s vocabulary. More-
over, while Watson sees a clear connection between the historical importance of 
legal transplants for legal change and the peculiar nature of the legal elites, Teub-
ner (1998: 16) prefers to point out “the inner logics of the legal discourse itself that 
builds on normative self-reference and recursivity”. To stress the internal logic of 
the law carries some undeniable advantage. In particular, it avoids the suspicion 
that the theory is too closely tailored to the historically close-knit English legal 
community and thus makes the reasoning easier to extend to other legal traditions.
Teubner (1998: 18) formulates four theses about the ties between law and society:
 (1)  Law’s contemporary ties to society are no longer comprehensive, but are 
highly selective and vary from loose coupling to tight interwovenness.
 (2)  They are no longer connected to the totality of the social, but to diverse 
fragments of society.
 (3)  Where, formerly, law was tied to society by its identity with it, ties are now 
established via difference.
 (4)  They no longer evolve in a joint historical development but in the conflict-
ual interrelation of two or more independent evolutionary trajectories.
The normative processes of the legal tradition have parted ways, according to 
Teubner, from the mechanisms responsible for producing social norms, leaving 
broad areas of the legal landscape relatively isolated from society. Teubner (1998: 
18) then explores the different types of ties that law still has with society. This am-
bition, as I will be discussing further on, is particularly interesting for legal schol-
ars who intend to formulate strategies to bring ideas and concepts formulated in 
other social sciences into the legal tradition.
As stated in his first thesis, Teubner (1998: 18) sees the ties between law and 
society as being generally loose, in the sense that the law mainly confronts social 
conflicts “on the ad hoc basis of legal ‘cases’”. There are, however, areas of the law 
where the legal tradition is much more closely coupled with other social discourses. 
A key example in Teubner’s analysis is played by contracts, that he sees as tightly 
coupled (in a so-called “ultracycle”) to the economic discourse. This not unprob-
lematic. As Teubner (2007: 68) explains:
Private law receives (…) information about the rest of society quasi automatically 
and almost exclusively through the cost-benefit calculations of the economic dis-
course. Any other discourses in society, whether research, education, technology, 
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art, or medicine, are first translated into the world of economic calculation, alloca-
tive efficiency, and transaction costs and, then, in this translation, presented to the 
law for conflict resolution. This means a serious distortion of social relations. This 
distortion of social relations by their economic contractualization has four dimen-
sions: (1) bilateralization-complex social relations are translated into a multitude of 
closed bilateral relations; (2) selective performance criteria; (3) externalization of 
negative effects; and (4) power relations.
This shows how urgently private law needs rid itself of this monopoly of eco-
nomic calculation and forge direct contact with the many other social subsystems 
in society that have different criteria of rationality than the economic discourse.
As Teubner (2007: 68) admits, there are instances in which the legal tradition 
inserts corrections which allow private law to connect to other social discourses, 
such as good faith clauses in contract law, but their effect is too limited to effec-
tively challenge the dominance of the economic efficiency paradigm. This aspect 
of Teubner’s analysis is of particular interest for the subject of this article. It is im-
portant to remember that the main coupling between legal scholarship and the eco-
nomic discourse is the influential law & economics movement, in which the ortho-
dox view on property rights, most famously elaborated by Harold Demsetz (1967: 
348–349), has been that individual, exclusive and transferable property rights are 
a key element for an efficient allocation of resources, as they favour the so-called 
internalization of externalities. The historical roots of this argument, regardless 
of the sophistication of the surrounding theoretical discourse, are deep, as it can 
be found, for instance, both in Aristotle and in the already mentioned physiocrat-
ic school. Another way of expressing this idea is simply that the possibility to ex-
clude others from using a resource provides an incentive to the owner to invest in 
his property. The point of contact between the legal discourse and economics is, 
in other words, quite small and it serves to reinforce, rather than dispel, the ideo-
logical bias against the commons that we saw erupt during the 18th and 19th century.
What lessons can be learned from Watson’s and Teubner’s analytical models 
for the issue of relative impermeability of the legal tradition to the theoretical de-
velopments concerning the commons? In addressing this issue, we must first of all 
recognize that there is a significant overlap between the two models. Both Wat-
son and Teubner clearly oppose the more simplistic versions of the mirror the-
ories. They also identify some peculiarity in the legal discourse that makes it a 
closed, self-referential subsystem in society. Law, in other words, follows its own 
patterns and conceptual structures in relative isolation from what theoretical ad-
vances occur in other segment of social science. In the areas of law that regulates 
the consumption of natural resources, this path dependence of the legal tradition 
has prevented the adoption of a new legal category, the commons, despite its rele-
vance in other social sciences and despite its obvious usefulness to collect similar 
phenomena under one conceptual umbrella. Using Teubner’s explanatory model, 
the commons have made a negligible impression on most legal scholars due to the 
fact that the main coupling between legal scholarship and other social sciences is 
law & economics, which is founded on the tragedy of the commons.
A particularly interesting jurisdiction, from this point of view, is Sweden. It is 
hard to deny that the Swedish legal tradition contains some prominent legal in-
stitutes that other social sciences would immediately recognize as commons. One 
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such phenomenon is the so-called allemansrätt (literally “every man’s right”), which 
allow every person to walk on someone else’s private land, pick a reasonable quan-
tity of mushrooms or berries, and even plant a tent and spend a night or two. There 
are limits, expressed for instance in criminal law, that protects the privacy of the 
landowner as well as his economic interests, but among cultural geographers, for 
instance, there is no hesitation in categorizing this phenomenon as a commons 
(see for example Sandell 2011: 5). The legal discourse has yet to develop a similar 
category. Something similar can be said about the right of the Sami, established in 
legislation as well as well as in case law, to use the land, including someone else’s 
private land, for reindeer husbandry (Bengtsson 2011: 527). Also in this case, espe-
cially interesting as it clearly reminds us of the chief example discussed by Garrett 
Hardin in his analysis of the “tragedy of the commons”, the legal discourse seems 
not to have taken notice of the commons.
As mentioned, one large area of the law where an interest for the commons has 
flourished is intellectual property. Using Teubner’s model, one could argue that this 
is a segment of the legal discourse that features a tight coupling with other social 
subsystems and that this is largely due to technological novelties that have made 
the classical property paradigm inadequate.
4. Legal ideology at work: incrementalism vs. institutional design
While the focus of legal scholars such as Watson and Teubner is largely to describe 
the relationship between the legal tradition and the surrounding social environ-
ment, there is also a strand of legal scholarship that has manifested the ambition 
of changing the way the legal discourse operates, effectively erasing the cultural 
inertia described by Watson. This theme can be found among legal realists both 
in Scandinavia and in the American legal tradition. I am referring, in particular, 
to the Swedish scholar Vilhelm Lundstedt (whose work, from this perspective, has 
in more recent times been discussed by Ulf Petrusson and Mats Glavå) and to the 
Brazilian-American scholar Roberto Unger, most prominently in his book “What 
Should Legal Analysis Become?”.
Both Lundstedt and Unger conceive the duty of legal scholarship as something 
more than the incrementalist aspiration to perfect the coherence and quality of the 
legal system one little corner at a time. They rather regard legal analysis as a tool 
for institutional design. In other words, their ideal jurist is not merely the judge, 
as is the case for most law schools, but also the legal expert lending her knowledge 
to legislative reforms.
Lundstedt was one of the most prominent legal scholars to follow in the the-
oretical footsteps of Uppsala philosopher Axel Hägerström (1868–1939), whose 
ambition was to grant law scientific value by cleansing it from the influence of 
metaphysics. Hägerström pointed out that already the much-celebrated Roman 
law featured rituals, such as mancipatio (the ritual of buying a res mancipi, which 
imposed on the buyer to recite a solemn statement and to put a piece of bronze on 
a scale), that were nothing short of magical. Hägerström (1927: 25) also criticized, 
often in harsh terms, the attempts of the European legal scholarship to reframe this 
genetic defect of Roman law by attributing to it a rational meaning (for instance, 
THE COMMONS │ 215
claiming that the mancipatio ritual simply was a way for the buyer to express his 
intention to conclude the purchase).
Lundstedt developed Hägerström’s ideas by criticizing what he called “legal 
ideology”, the idea that some concepts, that have no connection with reality and 
occupy an autonomous space in legal reasoning, are objectively true rather than 
being constructed and shaped by jurists. Glavå and Petrusson (2002: 109) remark 
that this attitude responds to at least two deeply felt needs: the scientific need to 
present law as the study of an objective reality and the democratic need not to de-
pict lawyers as producers of norms. Concepts such as “ownership”, “rights” and 
“duties”, according to this point of view are, at best, linguistic representations of 
psychological phenomena and did not have the dignity of facts in and by themselves.
For instance, if a subject A has recently purchased a certain product, and subject 
B somehow damages the product, a common way of framing the analysis would be 
to say that B owes damages to A by virtue of A having ownership of the damaged 
product. The idea of ownership therefore acts, according to Lundstedt, as a meta-
physical and entirely unnecessary part of legal analysis. Lundstedt instead suggests 
that A’s status with regard to the product is defined by a series of psychological 
mechanisms of variable complexity. A’s position would be completely empty of 
factual meaning if there was not a state apparatus able to defend his control over 
the purchased product and if other subjects – because of fear of processual con-
sequences, as well as because of their culture and morality – did not abstain from 
interfering (Lundstedt 1944: 518). Once the veil of metaphysics is removed from 
legal analysis, the legal system appears as a machinery whose wheels are humans 
and their psychological structures. This frees the actors of the legal system – the 
legislature, the courts, the legal scholars – to observe law from “realistic viewpoints” 
which can be used to further “social welfare”, so described by Lundstedt (1956: 140):
With the method of social welfare (…) as a guiding motive for legal activities, I mean 
in the first place the encouragement in the best possible way of that – according to 
what everybody standing above a certain minimum degree of culture is able to un-
derstand – which people in general strive to attain [italics in the original].
In other words, Lundstedt saw the “legal ideology” as the main obstacle to reori-
enting legal scholarship from being a merely incrementalist endeavour to becom-
ing a tool for social engineering. This view was clearly influenced by the political 
inclinations of Lundstedt, who was deeply involved in the social democratic party, 
responsible for the large wave of reforms that, during the 20th century, generated 
the Swedish welfare state.
A similar position, despite the well-known differences between American and 
Scandinavian legal realism, has been formulated by Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 
who criticizes legal scholarship for its inability to turn legal analysis into “institu-
tional imagination”. Legal scholarship, in Unger’s view, should be a driving force in 
elaborating new and better institutional arrangements but has been unable to do so 
because mainly because of what Unger (1996: 7) calls “institutional fetishism”: the 
tendency of legal scholars to preoccupy themselves only with existing institutional 
arrangements, which are only a subset of all possible arrangements. Legal scholars, 
in other words, are usually quite happy to polish their respective fields, changing 
a few rules here and there, but without letting their institutional imagination run 
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unbridled. This appears as another way of framing Watson’s circularity argument 
(“it is being in conformity with ‘lawness’ that makes law law”). However, its cause 
is not traced back to the idiosyncrasies of the legal elites, nor is it considered the 
product of an unavoidable feature of the legal discourse. Its root is rather to be found 
in the “rationalizing legal analysis”, which is “a way of representing extended pieces 
of law as expressions, albeit flawed expressions, of connected sets of policies and 
principles. (…) Through rational reconstruction, entering cumulatively and deep-
ly into the content of law, we come to understand pieces of law as fragments of an 
intelligible plan of social life” (Unger 1996: 36).
5. Conclusions
Several factors seem to contribute to the relative impermeability of the legal dis-
course to the commons. A crucial aspect of the Western legal tradition is its self-ref-
erentiality. This idea can be expressed by referring to jurists’ deeply felt need to base 
reasoning on normative authority (jurists tend to be looking backward) or, in more 
sophisticated terms, by discussing the legal tradition as an autopoietic subsystem 
in society. Regardless of the details of the preferred explanatory model, Watson, 
Teubner, Lundstedt and Unger all conceive the legal tradition as more or less cir-
cular, with limited ties to other social discourses. How these ties are formed can 
to no small degree be explained with reference to ideological and cultural forces.
To use a physics metaphor, one could say that, though history, different ideas has 
exercised different degrees of gravitational pull on the legal tradition. The “mass” of 
these notions is largely determined by political, ideological or technological factors. 
When the mass is large enough large chunks of the legal tradition will start circling 
around these concepts creating new trajectories. The liberal revolutions of the 18th 
century, as well as the cultural and political hegemony of the bourgeoisie during the 
19th and 20th century, has projected the individualistic and exclusionary notion of 
property into the centre of the Western legal tradition, making other elements of 
the legal discourse reorient themselves accordingly. With a slight exaggeration, one 
could say that the Western private law is, by and large, still following the planetary 
orbits that emerged during the 19th century. A challenge to the gravitational pull of 
private property has emerged, not only scholarly but also politically, as a response 
to the perceived failure of the state-market dichotomy following the 2008 economic 
crisis. However, while the commons have managed to become an important part of 
the political platforms of movements critical of the status quo, such as Occupy Wall 
Street in the United States, the Indignados in Spain and the Movimento Cinque 
Stelle in Italy, they have yet to have a significant impact on mainstream politics. A 
true paradigm shift will therefore require a considerable amount of political and 
intellectual energy and will, in any case, be delayed vis-à-vis other social sciences.
Legal education, especially in Europe, puts emphasis on interpretation and ap-
plication of the law. Jurists are trained to be judges rather than to assist in legis-
lative reforms. This aspect is clearly connected to the circularity of the legal dis-
course, as law students will be trained to work within institutional arrangements 
that have already been legitimized by the legal tradition. This, to use Lundstedt’s 
terminology, reinforces the legal ideology, namely the idea that legal concepts and 
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ideas are an objective reality that is given to jurist rather than created by the legal 
community. The legal autopoiesis described by Teubner seems to imply not only 
a detachment of the legal discourse from the production of social norms but, on a 
deeper level, also a psychological detachment between the legal community and 
the intellectual responsibility for its own conceptual world.
These observations allow us to formulate some rudimentary strategy to close 
the gap between the Western legal tradition and the commons. If one agrees with 
Teubner’s view of the legal discourse as characterized by varying degrees of auton-
omy, it is sensible to inject the commons paradigm into areas of the law where the 
coupling with other social sciences is relatively close. We have already mentioned 
intellectual property law. Other promising areas are those where property rights 
interact with obvious public interest, such as environmental law. It is clear, for in-
stance, that the notion of sustainable development, which since the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development of 1992 has become a central concept in envi-
ronmental law, has strong ties to the commons, insofar both require that attention 
is paid to the preservation of the resource for future generations.
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Filipo Valguarnera
Pravna ideologija i zajednička dobra: zbog čega pravnici zaostaju?
Apstrakt
U poslednjih četvrt veka bili smo svedoci rasta interesovanja i istraživanja zajedničkih doba-
ra koje je predvodila Elinor Ostrom. Ovi napori su doveli u pitanje prethodno ustanovljenu 
paradigmu tragedije zajedničkih dobara koja je najbolje izražena u radu Gareta Hardina iz 
1968. godine. Moglo bi se reći da su u međuvremenu zajednička dobra postala sfera istra-
živanja od fundamentalne važnosti u društvenim naukama. To nije bio slučaj kada je reč o 
pravnoj misli (uzimajući u obzir da postoji jedan izuzetak koji će biti analiziran kasnije) i to je 
tema ovog eseja, naime, složeni odnos između zajedničkih dobara i pravnika. Izraz „složeni 
odnos“ ne treba da upućuje na otvoren antagonizam, već na nešto još gore: potpunu ravno-
dušnost i skandalozan nedostatak znanja. Iako je moj glavni cilj da ovde objasnim dato stanje 
stvari, namera mi je da takođe iznesem opštiju tvrdnju o prirodi prava i pravne promene. U 
tom smislu zajednička dobra se mogu uzeti kao studija slučaja u pravnoj teoriji. Ovaj članak 
će razmotriti sledeća potpitanja. Koji status zajednička dobra imaju u zapadno-evropskom 
pravnom diskursu? Zbog čega većina pravnih mislilaca obraća tako malo pažnje na rastuću 
literaturu o zajedničkim dobrima? Koji faktori su na delu u ovom čudnom slučaju kulturnog 
slepila? Da li postoje razlozi da u budućnosti dođe do promene u tom pogledu?
Ključne reči: zajednička dobra, pravo, promena paradigme, pravna promena
